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Abstract 
 
Economists have long studied the relationship between the real and monetary sectors.  We trace out the 
effects of an exogenous real shock, the 1906 San Francisco earthquake.  The quake's impact 
manifested itself in international gold flows, as British insurance companies paid their San Francisco 
claims out of home funds in the fall of 1906.  The capital outflow threatened the fixed sterling-dollar 
exchange rate, leading the Bank of England to raise interest rates and discriminate against American 
finance bills.  The resulting contraction pushed the United States into recession, setting the stage for the 




The authors would like to thank Jeremy Atack, Tom Borcherding, Michael Bordo, Richard Burdekin, 
Anne Hanley, Richmond Harbaugh, Michael Haupert, Eric Helland, Jon Moen, Harold Mulherin, Larry 
Neal, Janet Smith, Adrian Tschoegl, Tom Willett, and seminar participants at the 2001 Economic 
History Association, 2001 Business History Conference, the University of Wisconsin at Lacrosse, and 
the Claremont Colleges for comments.  A special thanks to Sheree Leeds, the archivist at CGNU, for 
locating and transcribing the Business Minutes of Norwich Union for 1906 and 1907.  We would also 







I.  Introduction. 
       Claremont Colleges
               working papers in economics
Claremont Graduate University • Claremont Institute for Economic 
Policy Studies • Claremont McKenna College • Drucker  Graduate 
School of Management • Harvey Mudd College • Lowe Institute • 
Pitzer College • Pomona College • Scripps College   2
     
  Economics has a large theoretical literature that explains the interaction between the real and 
monetary sectors of an economy.  Empirical evidence on the money-output and output-money 
relationship is less clear, however.  The endogeneity problem between the two sectors makes it difficult 
to identify the effects of shocks in vector autoregressions (VARs) and calibration exercises.
1  This paper 
takes advantage of a natural experiment created by the famous San Francisco earthquake and fire of 
1906 to examine the effects of an exogenous real shock on financial and money markets as well as the 
response by a central bank.  While recent disasters such as Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the terrorist 
bombings of the World Trade Centers incurred property damage of about 1 percent of U. S. GDP, the 
costs of the San Francisco catastrophe were substantially higher (Wall Street Journal, October 9, 
2001).
2 
  Damage from the San Francisco earthquake and fire of April 1906 was estimated to be 
between $350- $500 million, or 1.3 to 1.8 percent of U. S. GNP in 1906;
3 large amounts of relief 
flowed into the city in the weeks immediately following the disaster.  Because British companies 
underwrote the majority of the city's fire insurance policies -- an estimated £23 million (or $108 million) 
at the time -- millions of pounds worth of insurance claims were soon presented in London.   The 
magnitude of the resulting capital outflows in late summer and early autumn 1906 forced the Bank of 
England to undertake defensive measures to maintain a fixed sterling/dollar exchange rate.  The central 
bank responded by raising its discount rate two hundred-fifty basis points between September and 
November 1906 and by pressuring British joint-stock companies to stop discounting American finance 
bills for the next year.  (Economist, October 20, 1906, p. 1694). 
  Actions by the Bank of England attracted gold imports and sharply reduced the flow of gold to 
the United States.  By May 1907, the United States had fallen into one of the shortest, but most severe   3
recessions in American history (Friedman and Schwartz, [1963]).  Thus primed for a financial crisis, 
already-weakened world markets crashed in October 1907 with the collapse of the Knickerbocker 
Trust Company in New York.  Ultimately, the Panic of 1907 led to one of the most important 
institutional changes in American history: the creation of the Federal Reserve System designed to 
provide for an elastic currency and to act as a lender-of-last resort.   
 
II.  Background 
 
The Panic of 1907 was a watershed event for the United States. This was the last in a series of 
financial crises during the National Banking Era that prompted reform of the American financial system.  
Troubled by recurring financial panics and the economic distress that resulted, Congress established the 
National Monetary Commission to consider whether there was a role for government in managing the 
nation's money supply. The Commission recommended the formation of a central bank that would 
provide for an elastic currency and serve as a lender-of-last resort. Congress passed the Federal 
Reserve Act in 1913. 
Given the importance of the 1907 Panic in the development of American financial institutions, it 
is not surprising that this event has been the subject of much investigation. Many scholars have 
attempted to identify the shocks that primed the United States for a financial panic.  In particular, several 
studies have tried to uncover the origins of a liquidity crisis that plagued the London and New York 
money markets from 1906 until the onset of the Panic.  Previous literature has generally pointed to an 
American shock in 1906 that prompted nearly $70 million of gold imports from England (see Sprague, 
[1910]; Sayers, [1963]; Clapham, [1944]; Friedman and Schwartz, [1963]; Goodhart, [1969]; 
Kindleberger, [1978]).
4  Policy responses of the U.S. Treasury and, more importantly, of the Bank of   4
England exacerbated the liquidity crisis, making American and world financial markets vulnerable to 
shocks that otherwise would have been temporary in nature.  Markets finally collapsed in October 1907 
with a run on New York’s Knickerbocker Trust Company.  We will briefly discuss some of the factors 
that contributed to the tightness in the London and New York money markets and their role in 
propagating the financial crisis.  The accompanying timeline, Figure I, summarizes key events leading up 
to the Panic. 
O.W. Sprague, writing on behalf of the National Monetary Commission, traces tight credit 
conditions in 1906 to New York (Sprague, [1910]).  He notes that the United States experienced 
surges of gold imports between April and May, and again between September and October.  As shown 
in Figure II, the United States imported over $50 million in the spring and approximately $80 million in 
the late summer and early fall.  Sprague attributes the first wave of gold imports to a cyclical boom in 
1905 that placed extraordinary credit demands on New York banks and the stock market, whereas he 
believes excessive speculation in the New York stock market explains the second wave of gold 
imports.  The U. S. Treasury, led by Andrew Shaw, subsidized these gold flows by offering to 
temporarily place public deposits in banks if they imported gold from abroad.  The policy lowered the 
gold import point by offsetting the interest lost while gold was in transit.  Goodhart [1969], however, 
notes that the gold import point was often low enough to have justified specie inflows without the 
subsidy.    
  In the fixed exchange rate world of 1906, such large gold outflows were a significant threat to a 
country’s ability to maintain the par value of its currency which, for the pound sterling, was $4.867.  
Faced with its lowest ratio of reserves to deposits since the 1893 crisis, the Bank of England nearly 
doubled its discount rate, from 3 ½ percent on September 12 to 6 percent on October 19. As shown in 
Figure III, the Bank held the discount rate constant for the remainder of 1906 and then subsequently   5
lowered it in early 1907. This would seem to indicate an easing of credit conditions in England. On the 
contrary, the Bank of England had, in effect, closed down credit facilities with American firms when it 
raised the discount rate in the autumn of 1906:  the central bank threatened joint stock companies with a 
7 percent rate on money if they did not stop discounting U. S. finance bills, credit instruments used to 
borrow overseas in anticipation of profit from exchange rate fluctuations.  The actions practically cut off 
gold exports to the United States. As shown in Figure IV, England reversed its position from a net gold 
exporter to a net gold importer. England successfully defended the dollar/sterling exchange rate, but at 
what cost? 
Friedman and Schwartz [1963] argue that the Bank of England's policy toward American 
finance bills altered the normal course of gold arbitrage and pushed the United States into recession. 
Typically, American banks and trust companies drew finance bills payable in pound sterling on their 
correspondent banks in London during the summer. They would then sell sterling bills for dollars; this 
would result in a gold shipment to New York. The finance bills would be covered in the autumn when 
the demand for dollars was high following the export of U.S. agricultural goods to Europe.  Forced by 
the Bank of England to pay off their finance bills upon maturity, American firms liquidated their stock 
portfolios in the spring of 1907.  The stock sell-off led to a short but sharp “Rich Man's Panic”, helping 
to push the United States into recession.
5  
  European central banks exacerbated New York's liquidity crisis by raising their discount rates 
throughout 1906 and 1907. Open market rates in Berlin and Paris generally exceeded call money rates 
in New York by two to three percentage points during the first nine months of 1907. Interest rate hikes, 
in conjunction with the repatriation of finance bills drawn in London, led to the export of nearly $30 
million in gold from the United States in the summer of 1907 (Moen and Tallman, [1990]; Tallman and 
Moen, [1998]).    6
  The New York money market entered the fall of 1907 low on cash reserves and primed for a 
panic. On Tuesday, October 22, New York's second largest trust company, Knickerbocker, 
experienced a run following news that the firm was in financial trouble. A day later, panic-stricken 
depositors ran on two other large trust companies, followed by several national banks. Within a few 
weeks, the panic spread to other regions of the United States. 
  Several measures were taken to contain the crisis. The New York Clearinghouse Association 
issued loan certificates, a money substitute used to clear accounts between banks. Clearinghouse loan 
certificates artificially increased the money supply and freed up currency for depositors who demanded 
cash. Federal aid came in the form of public funds deposited by the U.S. Treasury at key New York 
City banks, and J. P. Morgan formed a money pool with bankers to provide liquidity assistance to trust 
companies and the stock market (Donaldson, [1993]; Ramirez, [1995]; DeLong, [1997]). These 
measures eased conditions in the money market, but failed to prevent the suspension of specie payments 
(Moen and Tallman, [2000]). 
  As short-term interest rates rose to over 10 percent, gold poured into the United States from 
England and the rest of Europe.  Figure II shows that the United States imported over $100 million in 
gold during November and December.  Although the specie arrived too late to prevent a panic, gold 
shipments probably shortened the period of suspension and reduced the duration of the recession.  On 
the other hand, specie exports drained European money centers of gold, helping to transmit the 
"localized" New York panic to international financial markets (Goodhart, [1969]). 
  Previous research has focused on the role of "excessive speculation" and on the policies of the 
U.S. Treasury and the Bank of England in propagating the Panic of 1907.  These studies, however, 
have overlooked the role of the San Francisco earthquake in the financial crisis.  In this paper, we utilize 
data from contemporary newspapers as well as internal documents from British insurance companies to   7
examine the effects of the quake on American and world financial markets.
6  The payment of claims by 
British insurance companies to policyholders in San Francisco holds the key to understanding the shock 
that prompted defensive actions by the Bank of England and the chain of events that culminated in the 
Panic of 1907.  
 
III.  The Setting 
 
  By the time the transcontinental railroad was completed in 1869, San Francisco had already 
established itself as the center for export trade from the Pacific Coast region.  Endowed with an 
excellent natural harbor and easy coastal and river access to the agricultural and natural resource riches 
of the west, San Francisco had developed strong economic ties to other countries, particularly to 
Britain.  Most of the wheat exported from the west coast and bound for England was financed through 
San Francisco, and a sizeable number of London banks had offices in that city.   
  At the same time, other British financial institutions sought to expand their business in the area.   
Prominent among these were the British fire insurance companies.  In 1852, the Liverpool & London & 
Globe fire insurance company placed an agent in San Francisco -- the first such insurance firm (either 
foreign or domestic) in the city.    Two years later, three more British firms were writing business in San 
Francisco and the first American company set up shop, but it wasn't until 1858 that a San Francisco-
based company was established (Kirschner, [1922]). By 1890 in California, there were 127 American 
fire insurance firms, each underwriting an average of $13.5 million in risks.  On the other hand, there 
were 52 foreign firms (more than half of which were British), each of whom underwrote $23.5 million in 
risks; nearly 27% of California term fire insurance policies were carried by British companies.  In fact, 
the fire insurance company writing the most policies in California was Liverpool & London & Globe,   8
with total risks of $173 million.  In comparison, 28% of all fire insurance policy risks in New York were 
underwritten by foreign firms, while in Illinois foreign companies insured less than twenty percent of the 
value of all risks (United States Census, [1891]). 
  Twenty-five years later, these patterns persisted.  At the end of 1905, slightly more than half of 
insured risks were underwritten by American firms, with almost forty percent of business still carried by 
foreign firms, most of whom were based in Britain. On the other hand, California-based firms were 
writing only seven percent of fire insurance business in the state (Kirschner, [1922]).  The city of San 
Francisco was even more dependent on foreign fire insurers than the state as a whole.  By the turn of 
the century, it was estimated that at least half of all fire insurance policies in San Francisco had been 
issued by British companies (Cockerell and Green, [1976]). One explanation for the dominance of 
British firms is the long history of trade relations between the city and Britain; another is simple 
economics: as agents from the London and Lancashire insurance firm noted, the profit on San Francisco 
business equaled thirty percent – “three times greater than that yielded by its business generally” 
(Kirschner, [1922]).  Evidently, adjusters failed to consider earthquake risk. 
 
IV.  The Disaster 
 
  On Wednesday, April 18, 1906, an earthquake of Richter magnitude 8.3 hit San Francisco.  
Most of the damage was not done by the tremor itself (which was especially severe in areas of landfill 
where liquefaction occurred) but by the fires that followed.  The majority of the city's buildings had been 
made of wood; this material was far more plentiful and inexpensive than brick, thanks to the city’s 
central place in the coastal lumber trade.  The combination of close quarters, highly flammable building 
materials, and earthquake-damaged water mains hampered the efforts of firefighters.  Ultimately more   9
than four square miles -- about half of the city -- were destroyed.  Although fewer than 1,500 of the 
city's 375,000 residents were killed, damage was estimated at between $350 million and $500 million 
(Commercial and Financial Chronicle, October 19, 1907).  
  Word of the disaster in San Francisco spread throughout the United States within hours.  
Prominent financiers, members of Congress, and foreign delegations all promised aid to the stricken city, 
but private and government relief were minimal (Haas, [1977]). Because San Francisco was a major 
market for British fire insurance companies, however, much of the brunt of financing San Francisco's 
recovery was borne abroad.
7  The Economist reported at length on the consequences of the disaster 
for British insurance firms, pointing out that they had more than $87 million in policies in San Francisco, 




          Value of San Francisco 
  Company      Policies in Effect ($)    Estimated Losses ($) 
  Alliance        3,526,220      1,758,686 
  Atlas (& subsidiaries)      6,790,000      2,757,957 
  Caledonian and Cal.-American 5,457,727      1,521,064 
  Commercial Union and Palatine 7,802,722      4,116,281 
  Law Union        2,205,290      1,368,460 
  Liverpool and London and Globe  4,850,000      3,998,000 
  London Assurance      7,668,471      4,016,471 
  London and Lancashire and Orient  9,662,291      4,229,721 
  North British        4,021,943      3,012,500 
  Northern        4,238,646      2,063,926 
  Norwich Union     2,716,097         750,030 
  Phoenix and Pelican      5,000,948      2,808,313 
  Royal and Queen      9,044,050      5,787,776 
  Royal Exchange      5,518,342      2,639,564 
  Scottish Union and National    2,013,185      1,300,000 
  Sun          3,122,091      1,651,666 
  Union          4,238,775      2,345,420 
   10
  TOTAL                87,877,678              46,125,835 
         
  Of course, the magnitude of policies did not reflect the size of insurance payments to be made; 
some properties survived the earthquake undamaged.  At the same time, the insurers (in a particularly 
bad public relations move) indicated early on that no payments would be made on damage that resulted 
from the earthquake itself.  This was a sticky point: If the fires that followed the earthquake caused the 
damage but the fires themselves were caused by the earthquake, insurers claimed that they were not 
liable.  There were no clear means of allocating damage to the earthquake and to the fire, although some 
insurers proposed a 60-40 split: Forty percent of each policy claim would be denied "on the ground that 
the destroyed buildings were first damaged in that proportion by the temblor" (Los Angeles Times, 
May 8, 1906). 
  On the other hand, some company directors claimed that they were, in fact, forbidden to  
pay out such claims: 
 
    Under any circumstances, the British insurance offices will pay 
    only losses for which they are legally liable, since to go beyond  
    their contracts would be illegal.  They cannot recognize any 
    liability for damage by earthquake where no fire ensured nor for 
    any damage by fire to fallen or partly fallen buildings, nor for any  
    damages to buildings pulled down or destroyed by order of the San  
    Francisco authorities. (Los Angeles Times, May 4, 1906) 
 
  Reaction to these statements was met with published outrage: In one San Francisco newspaper, 
the editor's sarcasm was unrestrained: 
    To say that [insurers] will not recognize as an obligation the  
    destruction of a building by fire, which fire was the result of  
    an earthquake, is to take a position hardly more reputable 
    than that of an ordinary pickpocket.  (. . . .) 
 
    A HIGH WIND IS AS LIKELY TO CAUSE A GENERAL 
    CONFLAGRATION UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES 
    AS AN EARTHQUAKE.  THE PROPOSITION IS YET TO 
    BE ADVANCED THAT INSURANCE COMPANIES ARE    11
    NOT LIABLE BECAUSE THE WIND BLEW.  
    (San Francisco Examiner, May 7, 1906)  
 
 
V.  The Cost 
 
  The short-run impact of the earthquake on financial conditions in general -- and interest rates in 
particular -- was, perversely, rather small. Certainly, the sell-off of stocks by insurance companies (and 
some panicked investors) resulted in a significant drop in the price of shares
8, but there was little credit 
stringency in early spring.  As the New York Times reported at the beginning of May,  
    whereas a few weeks ago bankers were looking forward with 
    extreme misgivings to the Autumn, owing to the limitations 
    of the money market, they believe now, or at least a good many 
    of them do, that money is likely to be easier, and that the ease 
    will be more prolonged than could possibly have been the case 
    without the San Francisco disaster and the enormous liquidation 
    of securities which it precipitated. (New York Times, May 3, 1906) 
 
  In essence, the earthquake had the effect of softening credit markets in the first two or three 
months after the disaster. As shown in Figure V, interest rates on 60-day commercial paper for both the 
United States and England moved very little in the weeks following the earthquake.  Potential borrowers 
and stock speculators in the rest of the country were taking a wait-and-see attitude toward the disaster 
and its possible impact on economic activity.  At the same time, insurance companies were liquidating 
stocks in anticipation of making payments to San Francisco. 
  Funds for relief and rebuilding flowed into the city quite quickly.  As shown in Figure II, in late 
April and May of 1906, nearly $50 million of gold poured into the United States from Germany, 
France, the Netherlands, and England (whose contribution amounted to $30 million).  The New York 
Times (May 7, 1906) indicated that 80 percent of these funds were transferred to San Francisco; much 
of the rest was used to replenish the gold reserves of New York banks depleted by specie shipments to   12
the West Coast.   
  Most insurance claims took months to settle as some companies equivocated (as noted in the 
press) while others waited for guidance from a report of the Insurance Department of New York State 
which outlined how American firms should settle claims.  This four-point plan was not finalized until the 
end of July.  At that time, most British fire insurance houses signed on and agreed to settle their claims in 
accordance with the New York agency.  By October, it was estimated that more than $100 million in 
insurance checks had been received in San Francisco (Douty, [1977]).  Ultimately, British insurers paid 
out £10 million ($48 million) for earthquake damage (Cockerell and Green, [1976]). 
  What made this all the more significant for international financial markets was the fact  
that most foreign insurers decided to pay claims out of "home funds" rather than reserves in the United 
States.
9  The rationale for this decision was apparently based on transactions costs and thickness of 
markets: 
    Considering that their outstanding liabilities in America have been 
    largely curtailed by the San Francisco conflagration, it might have  
    been thought the companies would utilise some portion of their 
    funds there for the purpose of meeting the claims upon them.  It 
    was probably decided, however, that, in view of the magnitude 
    of these claims, the amount that could be so obtained would be, 
    comparatively speaking, so small that it would not be worth while 
    going through the formalities requisite to obtain the release of the 
    funds which are held by trustees for the company and for the 
    American policyholders.  (Economist, August 11, 1906) 
 
At home, the British companies were also hesitant to liquidate the securities in which they held reserves. 
 Given the size of losses involved, such sales would undoubtedly depress stock prices.  As a 
consequence, a number of firms negotiated term loans with their banks and so postponed securities 
sales for a few months (see Financial Times, July 6, 1906). 
This pattern of insurance payments can be seen in the experience of one British company, the 
Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society, which had over $15 million in San Francisco policies in effect   13
(Business Minutes of the Commercial Union Archives, [1906])
10. Following the earthquake, British 
firehouses gathered in London on April 20th to discuss their liability in the disaster.  The great majority 
of British insurance companies ultimately assumed liability for fire damage caused indirectly by the 
earthquake.  Members of the Norwich Union, however, had a special clause protecting them against 
losses caused by or through an earthquake.  These firms initially denied any liability in the San Francisco 
disaster. 
Because the refusal of some British firehouses to assume liability in the quake produced a large 
public outcry in San Francisco, members of the Norwich Union reconsidered their liability in the San 
Francisco earthquake.  Legal counsel in the United States advised these British firehouses to pay claims 
in order to avoid possible litigation.  Lawyers for the firehouses noted that British companies were likely 
to lose in court given that a San Francisco jury would be influenced by the “extraordinary conditions” 
surrounding the quake (Business Minutes of the Commercial Union Archives, May 28, 1906).  
Persuaded by these arguments, directors for the Norwich Union accepted liability for damage caused 
by the earthquake.   
Some British firehouses met early claims by selling assets held by New York trust companies.  
Norwich Union, for example, liquidated its portfolio in July 1906.
11  In the following months, the 
company utilized financial bills of exchange and even borrowed from London banks to settle insurance 
liabilities.  Consider the following cablegrams from Mr. Hare of Norwich Union: 
San Francisco drafts advised 523 thousand total drafts paid 447 thousand – Balance in banks 
42 thousand – May I draw?  (Business Minutes of the Commercial Union Archives, September 
17, 1906) 
 
Since this morning’s cablegram have additional notice of drafts so draw sight for  
  £17,571.1.2 time money 6 per cent, financial advice here is to borrow in London  
  and transfer by cable –such transfer being saleable here at higher rate than sight bills. 
  (Business Minutes of the Commercial Union Archives, September 17, 1906)   
 
  Total San Francisco drafts advised six [sic] fifty one thousand draw sight tomorrow’s.   
£20,682.10.6.  (Business Minutes of the Commercial Union Archives, September 19, 1906)    14
 
  Total San Francisco drafts advised 800 thousand – draw sight tomorrow steamer 
£8,274.14.5. (Business Minutes of the Commercial Union Archives, October 3, 1906)  
  
 
  In sum, then, the San Francisco earthquake gave rise to a massive outflow of funds -- of gold -- 
from London, both immediately after the earthquake and again in the autumn of 1906.  As shown in 
Figure VI, England exported $30 million in gold to the United States in April and May; this was 
followed in September and October by a further $35 million in specie.  In total, quake-related payments 
to the United States represented 40 percent of seasonally-adjusted British gold exports for all of 
1906
12 and over 80 percent of seasonally-adjusted gold imports into the United States that year.
13   
  Confirmation of the importance of insurance payments comes from gold imports into the port of 
San Francisco.  Typically, the city accounted for a negligible amount of American gold imports in any 
given month.  This was not the case in the fall of 1906, however.  As shown in Figure VII, the city of 
San Francisco alone imported approximately $11 million in the late summer and early fall of 1906.  This 
accounted for approximately 9 percent of all seasonally- adjusted U.S. gold imports in 1906.   
  The magnitude of the British funds flows can be put into stark perspective by noting that they 
represented a 14 percent loss in the gold money stock of England, exerting enormous pressure on the 
fixed sterling-dollar exchange rate.
14  Faced with its largest two-month net gold outflow of the entire 
period from 1900 to 1913 - Figure VIII,
15 the Bank of England nearly doubled the discount rate from 
3½ percent to 6 percent between September and October.
16  As noted earlier, this was accompanied 
by a discriminatory policy towards American finance bills for the next year. This policy reversed 
England's position from a net gold exporter to a net gold importer by the end of 1906.  Maturing finance 
bills led to a sell-off of American railroad securities and the export of gold to Europe.   
  The U.S. economy fell into recession by May 1907 and industrial production fell 40 percent in 
the next three months.  Gold arbitrage was disrupted by the inability of American firms to borrow from   15
England and other European centers as central banks undertook measures to protect their domestic 
gold supplies.  The United States exported over $30 million in gold during the summer of 1907.  New 
York financial institutions entered the fall low on gold reserves and primed for a panic, and American 
financial markets collapsed with a run on the Knickerbocker Trust Corporation in 1907.  Specie poured 
into the United States, draining London and other Europeans centers of gold.  An international crisis 
followed shortly thereafter.             
VI.  Conclusion 
 
  Economists have developed a number of theories to explain how real shocks affect the financial 
and monetary sectors of an economy.  Empirical evidence on the links between real and monetary 
shocks, however, is often difficult to uncover given the endogenous interaction of the two factors.  The 
San Francisco earthquake, on the other hand, is an identifiable exogenous real shock with a traceable 
impact.  We follow the impact of this disaster and its effects on the American economy and world 
financial markets.  We show how the payment of insurance claims resulting from the disaster prompted 
changes in money and financial markets worldwide; the Bank of England raised interest rates and 
discriminated against American finance bills for the next year.  These actions helped push the U.S. 
economy into recession by May 1907 and the financial sector crashed with the collapse of the 
Knickerbocker Trust Company in October.   
  Overall, our analysis shows that real shocks as well as the response by a central bank can have 
large effects on money markets and the economy.  Real shocks do not necessarily have an immediate 
impact on an economy or the financial sector, however.  It takes time before even a sizable disturbance 
equal to 1.3 to 1.8 percent of GNP ripples through an economy and has its full effect.  In the case of the 
San Francisco earthquake, the disaster propagated one of the shortest, but most severe recessions in   16
United States history and set the stage for an international financial crisis over a year later. 
  Historically speaking, the San Francisco earthquake was an important catalyst for reform of 
America's financial architecture.  As noted by London's Financial Times of July 6, 1906, "San 
Francisco's $200,000,000 'ash heap' involves complications which will be felt on all financial markets 
for many months to come [and] the payment of losses sustained . . . represents a financial undertaking of 
far-reaching magnitude. . . ."  Just how far-reaching the impact of the earthquake and the following panic 
were can be seen in a modern monetary power: the Federal Reserve System.  In response to the panic, 
Congress passed the Aldrich-Vreeland Act in March 1908; this authorized banks to issue emergency 
currency backed by commercial paper in time of crisis.  More importantly, the Act also created a 
National Monetary Commission to investigate the American banking and financial system and to make 
recommendations for reform.  The Commission's report called for the establishment of a central bank, 
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1 Temin [1998] surveys the causes of American business cycles from 1890-1990.  He discusses the 
    20
  
endogeneity problem confronting researches whey they try to identify the effects of real and monetary 
disturbances. 
2 Neal [2000] suggests that economists should pay closer attention to the economic effects of natural 
disasters and climate changes. 
3 The GNP data are taken from Romer [1989]. 
  
4 In addition to standard sources, we also searched The Times, The Economist, The Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle, and The Financial Times for non-U.S. factors that might account for the 
stringency in the London money market during 1906.  These periodicals also indicated that tightness in 
the New York money market was the key source of both the London liquidity crisis and the large gold 
outflows from England.  For example, in the fall of 1906, The Economist opened several issues with a 
discussion of the economic effects of excessive speculation in the New York money market on London. 
 Other authors such as Kindleberger [1978] cite various events ranging from an Italian banking failure to 
a Russian war loan as possible sources of the British gold outflow.  It remains, however, that during this 
period British gold outflows to the United States were nearly 250 percent greater than to any other 
country in 1906. 
5 Calomiris and Hubbard [1989] find that credit supply shocks were an important source of business 
cycle fluctuations for the period 1894-1909.  
6 Tallman and Moen [1998] find that gold shocks had a significant effect on output and the financial 
sector of the United States during the National Banking period.  They note large, abnormal gold shocks 
prior to many financial panics.  Canova [1991] documents the importance of external gold disturbances 
in propagating American financial crises prior to the founding of the Fed.  Our analysis identifies the San 
Francisco earthquake and fire as the real shock that caused large gold flows and primed the New York 
market for the Panic of 1907. 
    21
  
7This was anticipated by the editor of the Los Angeles Times who wrote, on May 1, that "It is going to 
tax the ability, not only of the United States, but of the civilized world under existing circumstances, to 
finance the enormous project of rebuilding the city of San Francisco. . . ." 
8 The New York Times of April 26, 1906 reported that "If it were possible to show the shrinkage that 
has occurred in the market valuation of securities as a result directly or indirectly of the San Francisco 
disaster, it would probably be found to greatly exceed $1,000,000,000.  (. . . and these data) support 
the assertion that the immediate effect of the San Francisco calamity has been sufficiently discounted in 
the security markets for the time being, with allowance, of course, for liquidation in special securities for 
special reasons." 
9Liquidation of insurance company assets drove down stock prices in general; at the same time, 
anticipated losses reduced the value of insurance companies' shares.  For example, shares in London 
Assurance (one of the companies heavily involved in the San Francisco market) fell from 75 on March 
30 to 51 1/2 on April 26.  See the Economist, April 28, 1906. 
10 This company consisted of four insurance firms:  Norwich Union, Commercial Union, Palatine, and 
Alliance. 
11 Business Minutes of the CGNU Archives, March-November 1906. 
12 In contrast, exports to France, Egypt, India, and Argentina each amount to only 10 to 15  
 
percent of total or seasonally adjusted British gold outflows.  If we include British gold exports to 
France in the spring -- to shore up French reserves lost as a result of that country's relief and aid 
payments to the United States -- we can say that more than 42 percent of seasonally- adjusted British 
gold exports were quake related, and such payments to the United States would account for more than 
2.5 times the British gold exports to any other country in 1906.  (British gold exports were 
deseasonalized using the Holt-Winters exponential smoothing algorithm). 
    22
  
13 If insurance payments by all foreign companies are totaled, the Times estimated that over $55 million 
in claims were paid out in later summer and early fall.  Although Britain was by far the largest foreign 
insurer in San Francisco, there were substantial amounts insured by France and, especially, Germany.  
(A few German firms were forced into bankruptcy by the disaster.)  The Times estimated that non-
British firms accounted for ten percent of foreign insurance payments made.  The Times can also be 
used to pinpoint when insurance companies paid out most of their claims.  It noted on August 9, 1906 
that "[insurance] losses will be paid out of home funds."  nearly three weeks later, on August 29, it 
reported that "thirty-five companies of the 120 involved in the San Francisco disaster have paid an 
aggregate of $55,000,000 in claims."  Finally, on October 18, the Times wrote that "all claims have 
now been paid expect those arising under policies with 'earthquake clauses.'" 
14 Data for the U.K. gold money stock are taken from Capie and Webber (1985). 
 
15  Individually, September 1906 ranks as #3 and October 1906 ranks as #4 in terms of the size of  
 
England's monthly net gold outflows between 1900 and 1913.  The largest single month outflow  
 
during that period was in October 1907, at the height of the Panic. 
 
16We searched the recorded minutes in the Bank's archives but located no specific statement  
 
about the impetus for raising the discount rate.  The Archivist at the Bank of England, Mr. Henry Gillett, 
noted that the Bank of England did not record discussions of discount rate changes during this particular 
period in British economic history.   
 




April 18, 1906                                                                  Sept.-Oct. 1906                                                                                  March 1907                              Summer of 1907                         Oct. 22, 1907 
San Francisco                                                                   U.S. gold imports of                                                                          Rich Man's Panic;                    U.S. net gold exports                   Knickerbocker 
Earthquake and              $58 million; US Treasury                                                                  Stock sell-off                            of $30 million                            collapses, onset 
fire          subsidizes gold imports                                                                                                                                                                          of Panic 
  April-May 1906                                                                                                                                                                                                            
U.S. gold imports of 
  $50 million: U.S. Treasury 
  subsidizes gold imports      Sept.-Oct. 1906 
            Bank of England                                                     England discriminates against U.S. finance bills up until the Panic of 1907 
             raises discount rate 
            and discriminates against 
            U.S. finance bills   
 
 




































































































































































































Source: Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance  
Figure III
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Source: Commercial and Financial Chronicle 
Figure VIII
Bank of England Net Gold Flows 1905 - 1908
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